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THE WORK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION RELATING TO
TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENT AL
HARM
(Paper delivered at NYU JILP Symposium on Development
and the Environment, 4 Dec. 1987)
STEPHEN

C. MCCAFFREY*

INTRODUCTION

The International Law Commission of the United Nations ("Commission" or "ILC'') is a group of 34 experts who
serve in their individual capacities and who are charged with
the codification and progressive development of interna tional law. The Commission was established in 194 7 by the
General Assembly to carry out article 13, paragraph 1 of the
U.N. Charter , which provides that the Assembly "shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of
. . . encouraging the progressive development of international law and its codification . ... " 1
Two of the topics on which the Commission is currently
working implicate issues relating to the subject of this Symposium, development and the environment. These are "International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out
of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law" and "The Law
of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses." This paper will review the background and current status of the Commission's work on the former topic
and will examine some of the issues it raises concerning development and the environment.
THE

COMMISSION'S

WORK

ON INTERNATIONAL

LIABILITY

The International Law Commission has, for years, been
• Professor of Law, University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of
Law; Member, United Nations International Law Commission .
I. U.N. CHARTERart. 13, para . I. For a discussion of the extent to
which a distinction can be drawn between " codification" and "progressive
ve Development: Law
development"; see McCaffrey, Codificationand Progressi
and the World Environment, 7 HARV.INT'L REV. 8 (1984).
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attempting to codify the law of State Responsibility. From
the outset of its work on that subject, it has agreed that the
topic of State Responsibility should deal only with internationally wrongful acts of States. At the same time , the Commission recognized that a State could engage in activities
that are not prohibited by international law - such as those
involving space objects and nuclear reactors - but which
might, through no fault of that State, give rise to injurious
consequences in other States. Accordingly the Commission,
at the invitation of the General Assembly, singled out for
separate study the topic of International Liability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law (hereinafter referred to as the "Liability"
topic). The need for the distinction between the two topics
was explained in the following terms:
The Commission fully recognizes the importance,
not only of questions of responsibility for internationally wrongful acts, but also of questions concerning the obligations to make good any harmful
consequences arising out of certain lawful activities,
especially those which, because of their nature,
present certain risks . . . . [T]he latter category of
questions cannot be treated jointly with the former. 2
The category of issues to be dealt with in the context of the
Liability topic had earlier been described by the Special Rapporteur for State Responsibility as "questions relating to responsibility arising out of the performance of certain lawful
activities - such as spatial and nuclear activities ... [o ]wing
to the entirely different basis of the so-called responsibility
for risk. " 3
Work on the Liability topic commenced in 1978. The
fact that after ten years the topic is still in the embryonic
stages of development testifies to its complexity and delicacy.4 A perusal of the summary of the Commission's discus2. Report of the International Law Commission on the work ofits twenty-ninth
session, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp . (No. 10) at 7. (1977).
3. Second Report on State Responsibility, [1970] 2 Y.B. INT ' L L. COMM ' N
178, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/SER .A/1970/Add.l.
4. For a description of the current status of the Commission 's work on
the topic see Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
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sion of the topic at its 1987 session 5 reveals that members of
the ILC still do not agree upon the basic question of whether
general international law recognizes a principle of strict liability for the injurious consequences of the kinds of activities
in question . Furthermore, and perhaps even more fundamentally, there seems to be no dear understanding of exactly what kinds of activities are involved . Some members
would confine the topic to what might be termed "ultrahazardous" activities, while others would include within
its ambit any activity having adverse transfrontier environmental consequences.
In his 1987 Report to the Commission, the Special Rapporteur for the Liability topic, Ambassador Julio Barboza,
submitted for the Commission's preliminary consideration a
set of 6 introductory articles . For present purposes, articles
1 and 4 are most pertinent:

Artic/,e1
Scopeof the present artic/,es
The present articles shall apply with respect to
activities or situations which occur within the territory or control of a State and which do or may give
rise to a physical consequence adversely affecting
persons or objects and the use or enjoyment of areas within the territory or control of another State .
Artic/,e4
Liability
The State of origin shall have the obligations
imposed on it by the present articles, provided that
it knew or had means of knowing that the activity in
question is carried out within its territory or in areas
within its control and that it creates an appreciable
risk of causing transboundary injury.6
These two articles as well as the remaining four raise a
host of interesting and complex issues. The facts of the disaster which occurred at Bhopal, India, almost exactly three
Thirty-Ninth Session, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 89. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 ILC Report].
5. Id.
6. 1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at 90-91.
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years ago today (during the night of 2-3 December, 1984),
will be used for the purpose of illustrating some of them. 7
As is now well known, the plant involved in the Bhopal disaster was owned and operated by Union Carbide India Ltd.
(UCIL), a company incorporated under Indian law and 50.9
per cent of whose stock is owned by the Union Carbide Corporation (Carbide). The latter company is incorporated
under the laws of New York and headquartered in Connecticut.

1. International Liabilityfor TransfrontierConsequences
The Liability topic, at least as originally conceived,
would deal principally with the issue of whether and to what
extent India would be liable to other states for any transfrontier consequences of the Bhopal disaster. There were in
fact no known injurious transfrontier consequences of the
Bhopal incident, because the poisonous gas that leaked from
the UCIL plant never left the territory of India. Assuming,
however, that there had been such consequences, India's liability could hinge in part upon whether the standard ofliability applied was strict, or fault-based. Article 4 as proposed
by the Special Rapporteur in 1987 appears to envision making the state of origin strictly liable provided the two conditions set forth in the article are satisfied: the state must know
or have means of knowing (1) "that the activity in question is
carried out within its territory or in areas within its control;" 8
and (2) that the activity "creates an appreciable risk of causing transboundary injury."9
Admittedly, the effect of article 4 is still uncertain, since
it only provides that, even if the two conditions are satisfied,
the state of origin "shall have the obligations imposed on it
by the present articles." What those obligations will be remains to be seen. Assuming they include an obligation to
make good losses suffered in the other state(s), however, the
7. For a complete account of the facts of the Bhopal disaster see the
opinion of Judge Keenan in the consolidated U.S. litigation . In re Union
Carbide Corp., 634 F.Supp . 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff 'd in part sub nom.
Plaintiffs v. Union Carbide Corp., 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) .
8. 1987 ILC report , supra note 4 , at 91 (emphasis added). For a brief
summary of the Special Rapporteur's explanation of the "appreciable
risk" requirement, see id. at 95.
9. Id.
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article would, to that extent, provide for strict liability. At
least in terms of the way in which the Commission has organized its work, this would seem appropriate: the State Responsibility topic covers internationally wrongful acts, while the
Liability topic covers the question of liability without fault
for injurious transfrontier consequences of inherently dangerous but lawful activities.
Even if strict liability is the applicable standard, however, the question arises whether the injurious activity must
not only be located in the territory of the state of origin, but
must also be under the effective control (as opposed to "control" in the sense of "legal authority") of that state in order
for that state to be liable. As drafted, article 4 would seem to
lay down no such requirement. This is evident from the use
of the expression "territory or ... control" rather than "territory and control." 10 This possible lacuna was noticed by at
least one member of the Commission, Chief Justice Razafindralambo of Madagascar:
[T]he concept of control had to be defined more
clearly as far as private activities were concerned. . . . That question had arisen in the case of
the activities of multinational corporations, in which
it was often difficult to identify the authority that
was actually in control. He had in mind, for example, the disaster which had occurred at a Union Carbide factory in Bhopal. The mere fact that a multinational corporation which exported investments
and technology was located in the territory of a
State was not enough automatically to entail the responsibility of that State, which actually had to be in
control of the local subsidiary. He was therefore of
the opinion that provision had to be made for the
two-fold requirement of territory and control. 11
This passage, while somewhat ambiguous, seems to express
l 0. Id.; See also id. art. I. As used in the proposed articles, the term
"control" is evidently intended to cover situations in which the activity in
question is not situated within the territory of the state of origin but is
within its control by virtue of its being within the jurisdiction of that state.
Examples are activities in maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the
state, and ships flying the flag of the state, or space objects registered in
the state. Article 2(2)(a) and (b), 1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at 91.
11. Provisional Summary Record of the 2019th Meeting of the Intema-
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the view that a state in the position of India would only be
liable for the transfrontier consequences of a Bhopal-like disaster if it had effective control of the local subsidiary whose
plant emitted the noxious gas. Indeed, generally accepted
norms of state responsibility would, in effect, hold a state responsible for the injurious consequences of private conduct
only if the activity involved was or should have been under
the effective control of that state.12 Such a requirement
would seem no less appropriate in the context of the Liability topic since if such control is not required, a state's mere
knowledge of an activity within its territory or jurisdiction
(e.g., the dumping of hazardous wastes) could engage its liability for injurious transfrontier consequences - even if the
state were unable to control the activity.
If the Commission decides that effective control is a precondition to liability, the meaning of that requirement in a
case such as Bhopal, as well as the effect of lack of compliance therewith, will have to be examined. It seems clear that
this kind of control presupposes, among other things, knowledge of the risks posed by the activity (as required by article
4) and the means to regulate or manage such risks effectively. It would probably not be realistic to presume that a
developing country, such as India, would have this knowledge and capability in every case involving imported high
technology. This point was emphasized by several members
tional Law Commission, 23June 1987, U.N. doc. A/CN.4/SR.2019, p. 21
(6July 1987).
12. See, e.g., P.M. Dupuy, International Liability of Statesfor Damage Caused
POLby TransfrontierPollution, in OECD, LEGALASPECTSOF TRANSFRONTIER
LUTION345, 354 (1977). Professor Dupuy observes that "it has to be established whether the private person's action completely eluded the controls which the State authorities might be expected to maintain, or
whether, on the contrary, it meant that those authorities maintained insufficient control of polluting activity (or whether the country's legislation
was unsuitable)." Id. A country's legislation could be found to be "unsuitable", according to Professor Dupuy, if it "proved to be at variance with
the criteria normally adopted by the other States or ignored the standards
defined jointly by countries co-operating in international organizations."
Id. at 354, n.2 .
See also Handl, State Liabilityfor Accidental Transnational Environmental
Damage by Private Persons, 74 Am. J. Int'[ L. 525, (1980); but cf. Principle 21
of the StockholmDeclarationon the Human Environment, Report ofthe Stockholm
Conference,U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, at 7, reprinted in [1972] 11 I.L.M.
1416, 1420.
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of the Commission, whose concerns are succinctly summarized in the Commission's 1987 Report as follows:
Other members stated that multinational corporations were at the forefront of the development
and utilization of science and complex technology.
These corporations often operated, beyond State
control, as the result of financial power and the sole
custody of knowledge on advanced science and
technology. The developing countries were in a
particularly
disadvantageous
position.
They
needed the multinational corporations to operate
within their territory in order to generate some economic development; at the same time, they lacked
the expertise to appreciate the magnitude of risk
that the work of these corporations could cause and
the power to compel the companies to disclose such
risks. In this context, these developing countries
were also victims. Their legitimate interest should
therefore be taken into account . 13
These considerations in tum raises the issue of "prior informed consent" and its variants (such as prior notification
and impact assessment), discussed in the first panel of this
symposium. 14
If, however, it were established that India knew or
should have known of the risk involved in the operation of
13. 1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at 101, para. 151.
14. See Walls, Chemical Exports and the Age of Consent: The High Cost of
International Export Control Proposals, 20 N.Y.U. j. Int'l L. & Pol. 753 (elsewhere in this issue). The environment ministers of the European Community recently rejected prior informed consent as the basis for regulations
concerning the import and export of dangerous chemicals. The ministers
decided instead on a regime of prior notification. 10 INT'L ENV.REP. (No.
12) 639 (Dec. 9, 1987) . But cf articles V and VI of the 1986 Agreement of
Cooperation between the United Mexican States and The United States of
America regarding the Transboundary Shipment of Hazardous Wastes
and Hazardous Substances (Annex III to the Agreement between Mexico
and The United States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area). Article V provides that the
designated authority of the other Party shall be notified when a Party bans
or severely restricts a pesticide or chemical. Under article VI, the designated authority of one country is to notify that of the other if it "becomes
aware that an export of a hazardous substance [to the latter] is occurring .... "
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the UCIL plant, and had the capability (in terms of expertise
and infrastructure) of regulating it but failed to do so adequately, India could be found to have breached an obligation
to other states to exercise due diligence in regulating or controlling the plant. 15 If found in breach of this obligation, India would have committed an internationally wrongful act
and would be liable for the losses occasioned thereby . 16
Such a situation, however, would fall not within the International Liability topic, but within the State Responsibility
topic which, as already noted, deals precisely with internationally wrongful acts.
To summarize, if the Bhopal disaster had entailed injurious transfrontier consequences and if the accident could be
shown to be the result of India's breach of its obligation to
exercise due diligence in regulating or controlling the plant
to assure its safe operation, India could be found to be responsible for the injurious transfrontier consequences under
rules of state responsibility. The more difficult question is
whether India would be liable for those consequences even if
it had not breached an obligation of due diligence (i.e., even
if it had done all it could reasonably be expected to do to
assure that the plant was operated safely and that the risk of
transfrontier injury was properly minimized). This question
lies at the heart of the Liability topic. It essentially asks
whether states will be strictly liable for the injurious transfrontier consequences of certain kinds of activities, such as
nuclear power plants and certain chemical plants, which,
15. On the requirement of due diligence see Dupuy, Due Diligencein the
International Law of Liability, OECD Doc. ENV/TFP /76. l l, reprinted in
OECD, LEGALASPECTSOF TRANSFRONTIER
POLLUTION
369 (1977); and see
Hand!, supra note 12, at 540, citing the resolution of the Institute of International Law on The Pollution of Rivers and Lakes and International Law,
arts. II and 111(1), adopted at the Athens session of the Institute, 4-13
Sept. 1979. See also supra note 12.
16. As already discussed, the determination of whether India had
breached this obligation could properly take into account India 's ability to
foresee risks and to regulate them. This would seem to be implicit in the
notion of "due diligence" , which may be taken to ref er not only to the
amount of care required under the circu mstances, but also to the characteristics and capabilities of th e state involved. If India had no means of
knowing of the risk, or if it had done all that it could reasonably have been
expected to do under the circumstances, it would presumably not be
found in breach of this duty.
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even when stringently regulated, pose a risk, albeit a very
slight one, of causing disastrous consequences.1 7

2. Liability of the Home State for Accidents in the Host State
Of particular interest for present purposes is the suggestion made by one member of the Commission at its 1987 session that the ILC's Liability draft should provide that a state,
such as the United States, would be liable for disasters such
as Bhopal. The proposition advanced is, in essence, that a
state in which a multinational corporation (MNC) is incorporated or headquartered or from which hazardous technology
is exported (the "home" or "exporting" state), should be liable for injurious consequences in another state (the "host"
or "importing" state) caused by the operation there of a
plant by a subsidiary of the MNC, or by the imported technology. In this scenario the "transfrontier" element would
consist not of pollution crossing a border, but of the export
of hazardous substances or technology. This argument was
based in part upon the premise that developing countries
lack the "means of knowing" whether activities exported
from developed countries by MNCs entail "an appreciable
risk of causing transboundary harm," as required by article
4. The argument is that "the State of nationality of the corporation [the home state], which did have the means of
knowing the risk[,] should be held liable for the damage
caused .... " 18
As indicated above, several members of the Commission
were indeed concerned about the ability of developing countries to exercise effective control over imported hazardous
substances and technology. 19 The question is whether this
means that, in a Bhopal-like situation, the ILC's rules on International Liability should provide that the home or export ing state would be liable for a disaster's wholly domestic in17. See 1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at ll l-113. The Commission
has not yet resolved this question and, since it raises no special issues for
developing countries beyond those that are treated in connection with
other topics in this paper, it will not be discussed further here.
18. Provisional Summary Record of the 2016th Meeting of the International Law Commission, 17 June 1987, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.2016, at 9,
14 (26 June 1987) (statement of Professor B. Graefrath of the German
Democratic Republic)[hereinafter "Graefrath Statement"].
19. See supra text accompanying note 13.
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jurious consequences. This is another way of asking whether
the United States or India should be considered the "state of
origin" under draft article 4 in a case such as Bhopal. A second question, which will be addressed later, is whether the
rules on Liability should require the private entity involved
(e.g., the parent company or exporter of hazardous technology) to provide compensation.
If the question were whether the United States could be
found liable under contemporary international law for the
injuries resulting from the Bhopal disaster, the short answer,
in my view, would be no. While an internationally-sanctioned regime may be necessary to regulate the transfer of
hazardous technology, 20 it seems far-fetched and even undesirable to suggest that general international law obligates an
MNC's home state to decide what kinds of technology may
be exported to developing countries, such as India, and to
determine the conditions under which it will allow such export. 21 The paternalistic overtones of such an approach
would not be welcomed by developing countries.2 2
Of course, whe ther the rules being elaborated by the
Commission in its work on the Liability topic should provide
for the liability of technology-exporting countries under
20. Seegenerally,TRANSFERRING
HAZARDOUS
TECHNOLOGY
ANDHAZARDOUSSUBSTANCES:
THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGALCHALLENGES
(G. Hand) & R.
Lutz eds., forthcoming); McGarity , Bhopal and the Expwt ofHazardous Technologies,20 TEX. INT'LLJ. 333 (1985).
21. This is not intended to suggest that states have no responsibilities
whatsoever concerning the export of hazardous materials, products or
processes. The Trail Smelter (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R. lnt'I Arb. Awards 1905
(1965) and Principle 21 of the StockholmDec/.arationon the Human Environment, Report of the Stockholm Conference,supra note 12 suggest that a state
may, under some circumstances at least, be obligated to inform the importing country of known risks associated with the exported items. The
exact contours of this duty , and the relative burdens on the exporting and
importing states, are less clear. See generally the discussion of "prior informed consent" by the first panel in this symposium, and supra note 14.
22. This is the main problem with the "high road " approach to the
problem of exportation of hazardous technology described by Thomas
McGarity. McGarity , supra note 20, at 335. Under this approach, all oper ations of multinational corporations would be subjected to the standards
applicable in the state of origin (e.g., in the Bhopal case, the U.S.) . Professor McGarity observes that "[p]roponents of the 'high road ' ... are subject to the charge of 'economic imperialism,' " since this approach would
have the effect, inter alia, of discouraging the export of jobs . Id.
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these circumstances is a completely separate question. It is
clear that the Commission did not have this question in mind
when it originally framed the Liability topic. 23 Instead, the
topic was conceived as "regulating liability for the dangers
inherent in certain major fields of activity made possible by
modern technology." 24 The Liability draft was, thus, originally intended to cover such situations as the Chernobyl disaster, assuming the Soviet Union did not in that case commit
an internationally wrongful act by, for example, failing to
regulate adequately the nuclear plant. It is doubtful that significant world order values would be served by extending the
topic to cover situations such as Bhopal. Several points seem
worthy of consideration in this connection.
First, a regime that would make the home state of the
exporter liable in cases, such as Bhopal, would most likely be
unacceptable to any technology-exporting country including
developing countries, such as India, that export technology.
This would do little to advance the rule of law in this field.
Second, there would be economic and social consequences of extending the topic. For example, imposing liability upon the state from which hazardous technology is exported would tend to discourage that state from allowing
such exports, or, at least, would lead to an imposition of
much stricter controls upon the kinds of technology that
could be exported and upon the operation of the MNC in the
developing country to which the technology is exported.
This would make it more expensive for multinationals to operate in the Third World and, thus, would result in shifting
jobs (and other wealth-producing activities) from the developing South back to the industrialized North . This would
hardly seem to represent a net gain in efficiency of resource
allocation or to advance the world order values of development and self-determination.
The problem that the Commission must confront (and
with which it is best equipped to deal) is how to allocate the
23. See supra text accompanying note 3; see also Report of the Working
Arising out ofActs not
Group on International Liabilityfor Injurious Consequences
Prohibitedby InternationalLaw [hereinafter WorkingGroup Report], U .N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.284 and Corr. 1, reprintedin [1978] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N150,
U.N . Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1978/Add.l(Part
2) (1978).
24. Working Group Report, supra note 23 , at 151.

726

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 20:715

loss when an activity in one state, which is lawful and properly regulated, nevertheless goes awry, producing injurious
transfrontier consequences of a physical nature in another
state . The latter state, which is entirely "innocent" or
blameless, should not be left to bear its loss alone.2s The
alternative solutions to this problem range from imposing
strict liability solely upon the state of origin to some form of
cost-sharing, perhaps in pursuance of a pre-arranged regime . However, the Commission should limit its discussions
to the original conception of the liability topic, which was determined by the Commission at the outset of its work.
3. Private Remedies
A second issue raised in the Commission's discussion of
International Liability in 1987 is whether the draft should
provide for the liability of multinational corporations. The
following summary of a statement made by a member of the
Commission of Indian nationality, Dr. S. Rao, provides important perspectives on this question:
[T]he events at Bhopal had clearly shown that multinational corporations controlled almost all aspects
of scientific and technological development.
The role of multinational corporations with regard to science and technology had been the subject of much criticism and, indeed, called for a separate analysis . For instance, if one such corporation
produced a dangerous chemical substance under
unacceptable conditions, the adverse effects were
known only to the corporation in question . Profit
was the primary consideration for those companies,
which refused to co-operate when adverse events
did occur. The situation was of the type which
called for application of the principle, formulated
by the Special Rapporteur, to the effect that an innocent victim should not be left to bear his loss.
The victim in that case was the State itself, millions
of whose inhabitants were affected by the catastrophe . . ..
Another policy question had been raised by Mr.
25. See 1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at 100-101.
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Barsegov [a member of the Commission from the
Soviet Union], namely, the need to encourage inno vation and enterprise in moving into new areas of
science and technology. In that regard, a balance
had to be struck between experimentation and reasonableness. Undeniably, certain beneficial activities had to be encouraged. At the same time, there
was invariably a time-lag from experiment to industrial application; the magnitude of the risk had also
to be kept in mind ....
. . . [M]ultinational corporations ... were agents of
profit. The main focus of the State, however , was
not on profit. Hence, it was dear that the State
must not be regarded as the only agent to be considered in connection with liability.26
The Commission's Report summarizes the arguments for
MNC liability as follows:
A few members, while they did not oppose the
Special Rapporteur's conclusion of attribution of
primary liability to the State, hoped that the Special
Rapporteur, in an appropriate place in the topic,
would indicate that in the final analysis compensation should be paid by the actual entity which
caused the injury . Such recognition, in accordance
with this view, was necessary to enable the liable developing State to seek compensation from the operator. 27
Treaty-law approaches to the problem of hazardous activities often employ what might be termed a private law approach. 28 These approaches channel liability to the operator
of the activity or instrumentality in question. Examples are
the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
26. Provisional Summary Record of the 2022nd Meeting of the International Law Commission, 26June, 1987, U.N . Doc. A/CN.4 / SR.2022 , at
5-7 (6July 1987). See also Graefrath Statement, supra note 18.
27. 1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at l l l.
28. See Survey of State Practice Relevant to International Liability for
Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by International Law, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/15 (Feb. 3 1984) at 250-268 (containing
multilateral and bilateral agreements).
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Damage 29 and the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability
of Operators of Nuclear Ships. 30 However, it is questionable
whether the Commission's draft should take this approach.
First, as noted at the outset of this paper, the Commission's
mandate is "the progressive development of international
law and its codification." 31 While private entities today are
significant actors on the international scene, 32 "they are not
international legal persons in the technical sense." 33 Thus,
"international law does not deal directly with multi-national
corporations, conglomerates, or other companies. " 34 It is
probably for this reason that all of the Commission's drafts
except one have dealt only with the rights and obligations of
states. The one exception is the Draft Code of Offenses
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 35 a project that
stemmed originally from the Nuremberg trials and is probably sufficiently sui gen.erisin character that it does not provide
a basis for addressing rules in other fields to individuals. Indeed, the Draft Code itself is controversial enough . It is
doubtful that contemporary general international law recognizes liability of an individual to a state for transborder harm
that does not rise to the level of an "offense against the
29. 1063 U.N.T.S. 265.
30. B. RUESTER& B. SIMMA,INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION
OF THE ENVI·
RONMENT
405 (1975). See also, inter alia, the International Convention on
Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T .S. 3;
the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy,
Jan. 28, 1964, 956 U.N.T.S. 251; and the Convention Relating to Civil
Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Material, Dec. 17,
1971, 974 U.N.T.S . 255. But cf. the Convention on the Protection of the
Environment (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) , Feb. 19, 1974, 13
I.L.M. 591, 592 (1974), 3; Draft Articles for a Convention on Liability and
Compensation in Connexion with the Carriage of Noxious and Hazardous
Substances by Sea, arts . 3 and 7, (1983), IMO doc. LEG XXXXIV.2, reprinted in (1984) 23 I.L.M . 150.
3 l. Statute of the International Law Commission, art. 1, para. 1, U.N.
doc. A/CN.4/4/Rev .2 (1982).
32. See generallyReport of the Group of Eminent Personsto Study the Rol.eof
Multinational Corporationson Devel.opmmtand on International Relations, U.N.
Doc. E/5500/ Add . l (Part 1) (1974); seealso Charney, TransnationalCorporations and DevelopingPublic InternationalLaw, 48 DUKELJ . 748 (1983).
& H. SMrr, INTERNATIONAL
LAw
33. L. HENKIN,R. PucH, 0 . SCHACHTER
344 (2d ed . 1987).
· 34. Id. at xxix.
35. For the background of the Draft Code and its present status, see
1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at 6.

1988]

INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION

729

peace and security of mankind" (if indeed such harm
could) .36
Whether international law should recognize such private
liability as a matter of "progressive development" is another
question. The Special Rapporteur for the Liability topic
seems to have answered this question, for the time being at
least, in the negative:
[H]e was not persuaded that these private law remedies were sufficient to exonerate State liability in the
absence of any [treaty] regime. In his view, private
law remedies, while useful in giving various choices
to the parties, failed to guarantee prompt and effective compensation to innocent victims who, after
suffering such serious injuries, would have to pursue foreign entities in courts of other States. In addition, private law remedies by themselves would
not encourage a State to take preventive measures
in relation to activities conducted within its territory
with a potential for injurious transboundary consequences.37
While public law remedies are not swift, the Bhopal case has
demonstrated that private law machinery can also be unconscionably sluggish. 38 It may well be that a greater degree of
36. In 1984 the Commission held a brief, preliminary discussion of the
question whether serious damage to the environment might, under some
circumstances, qualify as a crime against humanity under the Code. The
Commission's Report summarizes its tentative conclusions as follows:
[T]he Commission considered that, although just any damage to
the environment could not constitute a crime against humanity,
the development of technology and the considerable harm it
sometimes did - for example, to the atmosphere and to water might lead to certain kinds of damage to the human environment
being regarded as crimes against humanity ....
This applies in
particular to the treaties prohibiting nuclear weapons in the at mosphere, outer space, on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in
the subsoil thereof.
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its ThirtySixth Session, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 27 U.N. Doc.A/39/10
(1984).
37. 1987 ILC Report, supra note 4, at 111.
38. For a discussion of the factors contributing to the torpidity of private law remedies in such cases , as well as proposals for reform, see McCaffrey, Expediting the Provisionof Compensationto Accident Victims,in G. Handl

730

INTERNATIONAL

LAW AND POLITICS

[Vol. 20:715

involvement by the American and Indian governments
would have brought compensation more promptly to victims .59
Of course, none of this suggests that the Commission
should not propose model rules on private liability that
could be annexed to the International Liability draft and
agreed to by States in bilateral or multilateral treaties. Nor
does it purport to question the efficacy of the existing conventional regimes referred to above. 40 But it should not be
forgotten that the particular province of the International
Law Commission is, in the first instance at least, to formulate
rules concerning the international obligations of states. For
this reason, as well as the others mentioned above, the Commission should not become preoccupied with private law approaches to the liability problem.
CONCLUSION

The current work of the International Law Commission
on the Liability topic has raised several interesting issues relating to the broad field of development and the environment. The Commission's drafts on this subject will undoubtedly take into consideration in some manner the position of
developing countries . As is true of the International Watercourses topic, however, an actual dispute could involve two
developing states as easily as one developed state and one
developing state . For this reason, the problems peculiar to
developing countries would probably be better addressed
more directly (e.g. through an internationally agreed regime,
measures undertaken in technology exporting countries or,
perhaps even more appropriately, by multilateral development banks) .41 The need for bold remedial action is mani& R. Lutz, supra note 20; and McCaJfrey, Accidents Do Happen: Hazardous
Technowgy and International Tort Litigation, l TRANSNAT ' L LAw 41 (1988).
39. See Magraw, The Bhopal Disaster: Structuringa Solution, 57 U. COLO. L.
REV . 835 (1986), proposing the establishment in India by the two govern ments of a claims settlement tribunal.
40 . See supra notes 29 and 30, and accompanying text.
41. SeegenerallyAshford & Ayers, PolicyIssuesfor Considerationin Transferring Technowgyto Devel.opingCountries, 12 ECOLO GY L.Q 871 (1985). With
regard to roles that are being and could be played by the multilateral de velopment banks, see McGarity, supra note 20, at 336-37 ; Rich, The Multi-
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fest, but, as is so often the case, the real question is whether
states have the political will to take it.

lateral DevelopmentBanks, EnvironmentalPolicy,and the United States, 12 EcoLOGY L.Q 681 (1985).

